Designating propositions

Philosophical Review 111 (3):341-371 (2002)
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Like many, though of course not all, philosophers, I believe in propositions. I take propositions to be structured, sentence-like entities whose structures are identical to the syntactic structures of the sentences that express them; and I have defended a particular version of such a view of propositions elsewhere. In the present work, I shall assume that the structures of propositions are at least very similar to the structures of the sentences that express them. Further, I shall assume that ordinary names are devices of direct reference and contribute only their bearers to propositions, that n-place predicates contribute n-place properties or relations to propositions, and that verbs of propositional attitude contribute to propositions two-place relations between individuals and propositions. The broad outline of a framework that includes these assumptions is one that I think many, though again not all, philosophers of language find congenial. I am concerned here to investigate and explain, from the standpoint of this framework, a puzzling phenomenon. The explanation I give of the phenomenon could be adapted to fit with frameworks somewhat different from the one adopted here. I adopt the present framework in part simply for definiteness.



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Jeffrey C. King
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.
Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.
The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.

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References found in this work

Do belief reports report beliefs?Kent Bach - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
Nominalizing quantifiers.Friederike Moltmann - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):445-481.
Structured propositions and sentence structure.Jeffrey King - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (5):495 - 521.

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