Abstract
According to Fichte, neither antithesis nor synthesis is possible without an absolute thesis, or what he called a thetic judgment. The only examples Fichte offers are ‘I am I’ and ‘self is free’. These judgments are absolute judgments, whereby the subject is neither equated with nor opposed to anything, but simply posited absolutely or as identical to itself. Thetic judgments presuppose no ground of conjunction or distinction, yet formally they seem to assert the identity of the subject and the predicate. If this is so, there must be a third thing by reference to which the two are related. Or, in Fichte’s words, thetic judgements presuppose the requirement for a ground. In the proposition ‘I am I’ the ground of the relation is not present but must be sought as a task. The whole activity of the self is to find this basis. For example, in the proposition ‘self is free’ there is no ground of conjunction or distinction for relating these two concepts, but there is the requirement that the concepts be related. What the Wissenschaftslehre discloses is that these concepts can only be combined in the Idea of a self whose consciousness is determined by nothing outside itself.