Is the human mind a Turing machine?

Synthese 108 (3):379-89 (1996)
Abstract
  In this paper I discuss the topics of mechanism and algorithmicity. I emphasise that a characterisation of algorithmicity such as the Turing machine is iterative; and I argue that if the human mind can solve problems that no Turing machine can, the mind must depend on some non-iterative principle — in fact, Cantor's second principle of generation, a principle of the actual infinite rather than the potential infinite of Turing machines. But as there has been theorisation that all physical systems can be represented by Turing machines, I investigate claims that seem to contradict this: specifically, claims that there are noncomputable phenomena. One conclusion I reach is that if it is believed that the human mind is more than a Turing machine, a belief in a kind of Cartesian dualist gulf between the mental and the physical is concomitant
Keywords Infinite  Metaphysics  Mind  Turing Machines
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413695
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The Emperor's New Mind.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
Minds, Machines and Gödel.John Lucas - 2003 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
Computability and Physical Theories.Robert Geroch & James B. Hartle - 1986 - Foundations of Physics 16 (6):533-550.

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