Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3):429-57 (2016)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
‘Know-that’, like so many natural language expressions, exhibits patterns of use that provide evidence for its context-sensitivity. A popular family of views – call it prag- matic invariantism – attempts to explain the shifty patterns by appeal to a pragmatic thesis: while the semantic meaning of ‘know-that’ is stable across all contexts of use, sentences of the form ‘S knows [doesn’t know] that p’ can be used to communicate a pragmatic content that depends on the context of use. In this paper, the author argues that pragmatic invariantism makes inaccurate predictions for a wide range of well- known use data and is committed to attributing systematic pragmatic error to ordinary speakers. But pragmatic error is unprecedented, and it is doubtful that speakers are systematically wrong about what they intend to communicate.
|
Keywords | Knowledge Attributions Invariantism Pragmatics Error Implicature Context-sensitivity |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1163/18756735-09303005 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
View all 81 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Moderate Pragmatic Invariantism and Contextual Implicature Cancellation.Michael Blome-Tillmann - forthcoming - Analysis.
Similar books and articles
Strict Moderate Invariantism and Knowledge-Denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2029-2044.
Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657.
The Semantic Error Problem for Epistemic Contextualism.Patrick Michael Greenough & Dirk Kindermann - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 305--320.
The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.
Intrusión pragmática y valor epistémico.Pascal Engel - 2011 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (1):25-51.
Knowledge, Conservatism, and Pragmatics.Paul Dimmock & Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3239-3269.
Knowledge Across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Peter Baumann - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):363-380.
Perspective in Context : Relative Truth, Knowledge, and the First Person.Dirk Kindermann - 2012 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
Knowledge Attributions and Relevant Epistemic Standards.Dan Zeman - 2010 - In Recanati François, Stojanovic Isidora & Villanueva Neftali (eds.), Context Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter.
Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):219-232.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2016-10-24
Total views
286 ( #28,117 of 2,403,713 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #16,947 of 2,403,713 )
2016-10-24
Total views
286 ( #28,117 of 2,403,713 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #16,947 of 2,403,713 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads