Restrictions on representationalism

Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427 (2007)
Abstract
According to representationalism, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states supervenes on the intentional content of such states. Strong representationalism makes a further claim: the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states _consists in_ the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In what follows, I will attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest that strong representationalism must be _unrestricted_ in order to serve as an adequate theory of qualia, i.e., it must apply to all qualitative mental states. Second, I present considerations to show that an unrestricted form of strong representationalism is problematic
Keywords qualia  representationalism  transparency
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9079-y
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References found in this work BETA
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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Citations of this work BETA
Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.
Transparent Introspection of Wishes.Wolfgang Barz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1993-2023.
Intentionalism and Change Blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.

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