Shoemaker, self-blindness and Moore's paradox

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48 (2003)
Abstract
I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is thirdperson evidence available to the selfblind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises.
Keywords Epistemology  Introspection  Perception  Self-knowledge  Moore  Shoemaker, S
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00294
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Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture I: The Object Perception Model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.

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