The Challenge of Scientific Revolutions: Van Fraassen's and Friedman's Responses

Abstract
This article criticizes the attempts by Bas van Fraassen and Michael Friedman to address the challenge to rationality posed by the Kuhnian analysis of scientific revolutions. In the paper, I argue that van Fraassen's solution, which invokes a Sartrean theory of emotions to account for radical change, does not amount to justifying rationally the advancement of science but, rather, despite his protestations to the contrary, is an explanation of how change is effected. Friedman's approach, which appeals to philosophical developments at a meta-theoretical level, does not really address the problem of rationality as posed by Kuhn's work. Instead of showing how, despite revolutions, scientific development is, indeed, rational, he gives a transcendental account of rational scientific progress.
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DOI 10.1080/02698595.2011.623363
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References found in this work BETA
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth.Richard Rorty - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The Road Since Structure.Kuhn Thomas (ed.) - 2000 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kuhnianism and Neo-Kantianism: On Friedman’s Account of Scientific Change.Thodoris Dimitrakos - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):361-382.

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