The Heterogeneity of the Imagination

Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159 (2013)
Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining
Keywords imagination  mindreading  pretense  modal epistemology  fiction
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9313-z
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Nick Wiltsher (2016). Against the Additive View of Imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):266-282.

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Amy Kind (2005). Imagery and Imagination. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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