The metaphysics of personal identity and our special concern for the future

Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553 (2004)
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Abstract

Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this connection reveals that the above-mentioned objection to reductionism cannot get off the ground. Though the connection I propose is weaker than the connection typically presupposed, I nonetheless run up against a conclusion reached by Susan Wolf in “Self-Interest and Interest in Selves.” According to Wolf, metaphysical theses about the nature of personal identity have no significance for our attitude of special concern. By arguing against Wolf’s treatment of self-interest, I suggest that her arguments for this conclusion are misguided. This discussion leads to further clarification of the nature of the link between theories of personal identity and our special concern and, ultimately, to a better understanding of the rationality of this attitude

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Amy Kind
Claremont McKenna College

Citations of this work

Personal Identity and Ethics.David Shoemaker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Will it be me? Identity, concern and perspective.Patrick Stokes - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):206-226.
Non-reductionism and special concern.Jens Johansson - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Personal identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by Richard Swinburne.
Personal Identity.John Perry (ed.) - 1975 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
Comments.Derek Parfit - 1986 - Ethics 96 (4):832-872.
The Identity of the Self.Geoffrey Madell - 1981 - Edinburgh University Press.

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