Inquiry 47 (4):338 – 359 (2004)
In this paper, I consider the validity and proper formulation of the only-x-and-y principle, which states, roughly, that whether a later individual, y, is numerically identical to an earlier individual, x, can depend only on facts about x and y and the relationships between them. In the course of my investigation, I distinguish between two classes of physical entities - those that exist in a 'real' sense, and those that exist in a mere Cambridge sense. This distinction is grounded in Peter Geach's distinction between 'real' and mere Cambridge change. I argue in favor of a modified version of the only-x-and-y principle - the qualified only-x-and-y principle - which applies to entities that exist in a 'real' sense, but not to mere Cambridge entities. It is also argued that the plausibility of the qualified only-x-and-y principle has more to do with facts about the nature of causality than with intuitions we have about existence or numerical identity. I finish by considering some traditional objections to the only-x-and-y principle, and conclude that they do not succeed in refuting the qualified only-x-and-y principle
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No Lacuna and No Vicious Regress: A Reply to le Poidevin.Christina Conroy - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):367-372.
Similar books and articles
Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents.Peter J. Taylor - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304-310.
Commodification or Compensation: A Reply to Ketchum.H. M. Malm - 1989 - Hypatia 4 (3):128-135.
A Novel Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms.P. X. Monaghan - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (1):63-78.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #287,606 of 2,146,275 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #386,504 of 2,146,275 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.