Idle Questions

Journal of Philosophy (2024)
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Abstract

In light of the problem of logical omniscience, some scholars have argued that belief is question-sensitive: agents don't simply believe propositions but rather believe answers to questions. Hoek (2022) has recently developed a version of this approach on which a belief state is a "web" of questions and answers. Here, we present several challenges to Hoek's question-sensitive account of belief. First, Hoek's account is prone to very similar logical omniscience problems as those he claims to address. Second, the link between belief and action he proposes is too rigid. We close by sketching a generalization of the account that can meet these challenges.

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Author Profiles

Jens Kipper
University of Rochester
Alexander W. Kocurek
University of California, San Diego
Zeynep Soysal
University of Rochester

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Construction of Logical Space.Agustín Rayo - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto & Mark Jago - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Jago.

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