Particularism and default valency

Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):16-32 (2007)

Simon Kirchin
University of Kent
In this paper, I concentrate on the notion of default valency, drawing on some of the distinctions made and thoughts given in my Introduction. I motivate why the notion is important for particularists to have up their sleeves by outlining a recent debate between particularists and generalists. I then move to the main aim of the piece which is to discuss how anyone, particularist and generalist alike, might seek to distinguish reason-generating features into different types. My main aim is not to argue for a specific way of dividing such features into types but to present various taxonomical options. Key Words: ethics • features • generalism • particularism • valency.
Keywords valency   ethics   particularism   generalism   features
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DOI 10.1177/1740468106072780
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References found in this work BETA

Morality and Thick Concepts.Allan Gibbard & Simon Blackburn - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):267 - 299.
Morality and Thick Concepts.Allan Gibbard & Simon Blackburn - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 66:267-299.

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Moral Particularism.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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