Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):74-81 (2020)

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Abstract
I present two caveats to the meta-problem challenge to theories of consciousness. Chalmers suggests that a theory of consciousness that solves the hard problem should also inform us about the meta-problem, and vice versa. The first caveat is the view that mechanism M, the mechanism through which content becomes conscious, may be neutral with respect to the content it renders conscious. This means that there can be no systematic connection between M and conscious content. The second caveat concerns how we should treat the problem intuitions fueling the meta-problem. I argue that we should award them no special status with respect to their explanatory power in relation to the hard problem.
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Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):227-257.

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