Philosophical Studies 139 (1):73-89 (2008)
Abstract |
If zombies were conceivable in the sense relevant to the ‘conceivability argument’ against physicalism, a certain epiphenomenalistic conception of consciousness—the ‘e-qualia story’—would also be conceivable. But the e-qualia story is not conceivable because it involves a contradiction. The non-physical ‘e-qualia’ supposedly involved could not perform cognitive processing, which would therefore have to be performed by physical processes; and these could not put anyone into ‘epistemic contact’ with e-qualia, contrary to the e-qualia story. Interactionism does not enable zombists to escape these conclusions
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Keywords | Zombies Consciousness Epiphenomenalism Physicalism Conceivability Conceivability argument Qualia Mental causation Privacy Chalmers |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-007-9103-2 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.
Analyzing the etiological functions of consciousness.Dylan Black - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):191-216.
Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (3):397-418.
View all 9 citations / Add more citations
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