Mind and Language 33 (3):280-298 (2018)

Authors
Andrew Kissel
Old Dominion University
Abstract
This article focuses on philosophical views that attempt to explain widespread belief in indeterministic choice by following a strategy that harkens back at least to Spinoza. According to this Spinozan strategy, people draw an inference from the absence of experiences of determined choice to the belief in indeterministic choice. Accounts of this kind are historically liable to overgeneralization. The pair of accounts defended in Shaun Nichols’ recent book, Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility, are the most complete and empirically plausible representatives of this strategy. I argue that both accounts ultimately fail, and overgeneralization worries remain for Spinozan strategists.
Keywords determinism  folk intuitions  free will  incompatibilism  libertarianism  moral responsibility  phenomenology
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12176
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Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.

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