Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):97-117 (2010)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
While Spinoza claims that our good is both what increases our essential power and what helps us to satisfy our desires, he admits that people desire things that do not increase their power. This paper addresses this problem by arguing that Spinoza conceives of desires as expressions of our conatus , so that satisfying our desires necessarily increases our power and vice versa. This reading holds, in opposition to recent work, that Spinoza upholds a desire-satisfaction theory of the good, though an unusual one, since our good is only determined by desires arising from our conatus , in other words, active desires.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01360.x |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Spinoza on Lying and Suicide.Steven Nadler - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2):257-278.
Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation.Justin Steinberg - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):67-87.
Spinoza's Guise of the Good: Getting to the Bottom of 3p9s.Matthew J. Kisner - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):34-47.
Spinoza’s Analysis of His Imagined Readers’ Axiology.Benedict Rumbold - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (2):281-312.
Spinoza’s Genealogical Critique of His Contemporaries’ Axiology.Benedict Rumbold - 2017 - Intellectual History Review 27 (4):543-560.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
The Problem of Defective Desires.Chris Heathwood - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):487 – 504.
Projectivist Utilitarianism and the Satisfaction of Desire.David Gordon - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (3):437 - 443.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2010-03-02
Total views
114 ( #101,257 of 2,498,254 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #171,224 of 2,498,254 )
2010-03-02
Total views
114 ( #101,257 of 2,498,254 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #171,224 of 2,498,254 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads