Some problems for Lowe's four-category ontology

Analysis 64 (2):146–151 (2004)
In E.J. Lowe's ontology, (individual) objects are property-bearers which 1) have identity and 2) are countable. This makes it possible to become or cease to be an object, by beginning or ceasing to fulfil one of these conditions. But the possibility of switching fundamental ontological categories should be excluded. Furthermore, Lowe does not show that “quasi-individuals” (which are not countable) can exist. I argue against Lowe that kinds cannot be property-bearers in a more genuine sense than properties, that they are not absolutely countable, whether conceived according to science or common sense, and that they are dependent on individual objects
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2004.00476.x
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References found in this work BETA
A Survey of Metaphysics.E. J. Lowe - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa.John Dupré - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):66-90.
Dispositions and Laws.E. J. Lowe - 2001 - Metaphysica 2:5-23.

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The Four-Category Ontology: Reply to Kistler.E. J. Lowe - 2004 - Analysis 64 (282):152–157.

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