Authors
Andrew Kissel
Old Dominion University
Abstract
This paper raises objections to what I call the Cartesian Doxastic Argument for free will: the argument that it is probably true that we are free on the grounds that there is already widespread intuitive belief in that claim. Richard Swinburne provides the best extant defense of the argument, using his principle of credulity, which holds that beliefs are probably true merely on the believer’s evidence that they believe it. I argue that the PoC is either too liberal, justifying intuitively unjustified beliefs, or else is inapplicable in practice. I then show that attempts to reformulate the principle to avoid liberality render it too weak to support the Cartesian Doxastic Argument. These failures suggest that any version of the argument that relies on similar principles is likely to fail.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/jpr20201217153
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,864
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Doxastic Determinism.Steve Bein - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:5-12.
Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.
Doxastic Voluntarism and Self-Deception.Anthony R. Booth - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):115 - 130.
Holding the Faith True.John Zeis - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):161-170.
Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-12-18

Total views
6 ( #1,083,534 of 2,433,133 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #114,871 of 2,433,133 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes