Abilities to do otherwise

Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3017-3035 (2015)
Simon Kittle
University of Innsbruck
In this paper I argue that there are different ways that an agent may be able to do otherwise and that therefore, when free will is understood as requiring that an agent be able to do otherwise, we face the following question: which way of being able to do otherwise is most relevant to free will? I answer this question by first discussing the nature of intrinsic dispositions and abilities, arguing that for each action type there is a spectrum of intrinsic abilities. I suggest that recognising this allows us to articulate two ways in which an intrinsic ability is general. And I argue that the abilities most relevant to free will need to be nongeneral in both of the ways identified. Along the way I show why these points threaten to undermine Vihvelin’s dispositionalist account of free will.
Keywords Free will  Determinism  The ability to do otherwise
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0455-8
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References found in this work BETA

Finkish Dispositions.David Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):427-450.
Dispositions and Antidotes.Alexander Bird - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.

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Citations of this work BETA

Free Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Simon Kittle - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield

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