Against the monism of the moment: A reply to Elliott Sober

Philosophy of Science 51 (4):616-630 (1984)
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Abstract

In his "Discussion" (1984), Elliott Sober offers some criticisms of the view about species--pluralistic realism--advocated in my 1984. Sober's comments divide into three parts. He attempts to show that species are not sets; he responds to my critique of David Hull's thesis that species are individuals; and he offers some arguments for the claim that species are "chunks of the genealogical nexus." I consider each of these objections in turn, arguing that each of them fails. I attempt to use Sober's insightful critique to explain and defend pluralistic realism more fully.

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Philip Kitcher
Columbia University

Citations of this work

Eliminative pluralism.Marc Ereshefsky - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):671-690.
Species as individuals.Berit Brogaard - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):223-242.
For pluralism and against realism about species.P. Kyle Stanford - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):70-91.

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References found in this work

Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
A matter of individuality.David L. Hull - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):335-360.
Species.Philip Kitcher - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (2):308-333.

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