Disputatio 9 (44):35-57 (2017)

Authors
Simon Kittle
University of Leeds
Abstract
Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various alternatives that remain in the cases presented, while Frankfurtians have objected that such alternatives are typically not capable of grounding responsibility. In this essay I address the recent suggestion by Seth Shabo that only alternatives associated with the ‘up to us’ locution ground moral responsibility. I distinguish a number of kinds of ability, suggest which kinds of abilities ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution, and outline how these distinctions apply to the indeterministic buffer cases.
Keywords free will  alternative possibilities  Frankfurt-style cases  abilities  control
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2017-0026
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.

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Citations of this work BETA

Possibilites for Divine Freedom.Simon Kittle - 2016 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 64 (4):93-123.
How (Not) to Think About the Sense of 'Able' Relevant to Free Will.Simon Kittle - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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