David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (1993)
During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects working in isolation, but by people with a variety of personal and social interests, who cooperate and compete with one another, he argues that, nonetheless, we may conceive the growth of science as a process in which both our vision of nature and our ways of learning more about nature improve. Offering a detailed picture of the advancement of science, he sets a new agenda for the philosophy of science and for other "science studies" disciplines.
|Keywords||Science Philosophy Science History|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$3.43 used (96% off) $6.50 new (92% off) $73.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||Q175.K533 1993|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2009). Against Arguments From Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):332 - 356.
J. Ladyman (1998). What is Structural Realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Idealizations and Scientific Understanding. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):237-252.
Maarten Boudry, Stefaan Blancke & Massimo Pigliucci (2014). What Makes Weird Beliefs Thrive? The Epidemiology of Pseudoscience. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1177-1198.
Alvin I. Goldman (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
Similar books and articles
John Losee (1987). Philosophy of Science and Historical Enquiry. Oxford University Press.
José Antonio Díez Calzada (1994). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Theoria 9 (1):212-216.
Gerald James Holton (1986). The Advancement of Science, and its Burdens: With a New Introduction. Harvard University Press.
Harold Kincaid, John Dupré & Alison Wylie (eds.) (2007). Value-Free Science?: Ideals and Illusions. Oxford University Press.
Mary Tiles (1984). Bachelard, Science and Objectivity. Cambridge University Press.
Patrick Enfield (1996). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Cogito 10 (2):158-159.
J. Dupre (1995). Review of Kitcher: "The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions". [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations.
M. Solomon (1995). Legend Naturalism and Scientific Progress: An Essay on Philip Kitcher's the Advancement of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (2):205-218.
Jarrett Leplin (1994). Book Review:The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusion Philip Kitcher. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 61 (4):666-.
Steve Fuller (1994). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (2):251-261.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads100 ( #46,706 of 1,924,770 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #58,070 of 1,924,770 )
How can I increase my downloads?