Sociologizing metaphysics and mind: A pragmatist point of view on the methodology of the social sciences [Book Review]

Human Studies 30 (2):97 - 114 (2007)
Abstract
There are realist philosophers and social scientists who believe in the indispensability of social ontology. However, we argue that certain pragmatist outlines for inquiry open more fruitful roads to empirical research than such ontologizing perspectives. The pragmatist conceptual tools in a Darwinian vein—concepts like action, habit, coping and community—are in a particularly stark contrast with, for instance, the Searlean and Chomskian metaphysics of human being. In particular, we bring Searle's realist philosophy of society and mind under critical survey in this paper and contrast it with a pragmatist, sociologizing approach. Drawing from Dewey, James, and recent antirepresentationalism, we propose for research work a methodological relationalism of its own kind, altogether detached from the ontologies of society and mind.
Keywords Methodological relationalism  Ontology  Pragmatism  Realism  Sociology of mind
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DOI 10.1007/s10746-007-9049-6
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.

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Genocide Reconsidered: A Pragmatist Approach.Erik Schneiderhan - 2013 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 43 (3):280-300.
Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice.Simon Lohse - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1):3-27.

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