Zhuangzi and Skepticism

Dissertation, Stanford University (1993)
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Abstract

This dissertation offers a philosophical account of Zhuangzi's thought, particularly of his skepticism and the background assumptions on which he advocates skepticism as a way of living. Before presenting my own views, I consider several other lines of interpretation, both to raise theoretical and textual issues and to situate my own work in the context of existing scholarship. In the first two chapters I translate and analyze selected Neo-Daoist and early Buddhist commentaries in order to emphasize the influence these two distinct and often conflicting traditions have exercised over modern receptions of the text. The next five chapters examine modern interpretations of Zhuangzi as an advocate of personal freedom, mystical insight, relativism, skillful living, and spontaneity, respectively, looking at the works of Fung, Creel, Maspero, Yearley, Hansen, Wu, Ivanhoe, and Graham, among others. In the final two chapters I offer my own interpretation, which is to understand Zhuangzi as responding to a distinctive philosophical problem, that of choosing between competing conceptual schemes, particularly as instantiated in different methodologies and terminologies. He is skeptical of the possibility of establishing a scheme as correct. And yet the simple fact that he wrote anything down is evidence of his belief that skepticism itself offers the best possible solution to the otherwise irresolvable problem. Close attention to the text reveals the basis of this belief in a cluster of assumptions which I refer to collectively as Zhuangzi's "naturalism." Briefly put, Zhuangzi thinks that the good life is the natural life and that people live naturally when they respond to their situations with the open-mindedness and flexibility that skepticism brings. Both the strengths and the limitations of this position are highlighted by a consideration of the objection raised against Zhuangzi by the Confucian philosopher Xunzi, who argues that the good life depends on the cultivation of certain desires which are not in us originally and consequently which no amount of open-mindedness can be counted upon to reveal. The appendix collects the available historical material concerning the text itself and how it came down to us in its present form

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