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Abstract
In order to be complete, Horwich’s minimalist theory must be able to deal with generalizations about truth. A logical and an epistemic-explanatory level of the generalization problem are distinguished, and Horwich’s responses to both sides of the problem are examined. Finally some persistent problems for minimalism are pointed out.
Keywords Horwich  minimalism of truth  generalization problem
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