Is rationality really “bounded” by information processing constraints?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):683-684 (2000)

Extremist views on normative rationality fail to address differences in responding owing to intellectual ability or epistemic self-regulation. Individual difference research thus raises serious questions concerning the scientific utility of universal rationality and universal irrationality theories. However, recent data indicate that computational capacity theories do not account adequately for within-subject variability in normative responding, memory-reasoning independence, and instances of ability-normative reasoning independence.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x00413439
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