Philosophy Compass 10 (1):38-51 (2015)

Authors
Max Kölbel
University of Vienna
Abstract
In the pair of articles of which this is the first, I shall present a set of problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with the term “relativism”. All these problems and proposals concern the question of how we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue here is whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, alternatively, their correctness should be thought of as varying with some (more or less surprising) factor. In this, first, article, I shall discuss the general issue of relativism about representational content. I shall claim that there are legitimate ways of attributing contents that are absolute truth-bearers, and there are also equally legitimate ways of attributing relativistic representational contents. In the companion piece “Relativism 2: Semantic Content”, I look in more detail at the more specific question whether semantic contents (i.e. the contents assigned to linguistic utterances in the semantics of natural language) should be construed in an absolutist or a relativist way.
Keywords relativism  content  representation  perceptual content  proposition  semantic content  centered content  de se
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/phc3.12190
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References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA

Relativism and Assertion.Alexander Dinges - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):730-740.
Convergence, Community, and Force in Aesthetic Discourse.Nick Riggle - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Perspectival Representation and Fallacies in Metaethics.Max Kölbel - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):379-404.

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