Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):242-257 (2008)

Authors
Max Kölbel
University of Vienna
Abstract
Semantic theories for natural languages purport to describe a central aspect of the meaning of natural language sentences. In doing so, they usually employ some notion of truth. Most semanticists, even those who have no objections to invoking propositions, will define a truth-predicate that applies to sentences. Some will also employ a notion of propositional truth. Both types of semanticist face the question whether and how the semantic notion(s) of truth they are employing is (are)related to the ordinary, pre-theoretic notion(s) of truth. It seems immediately problematic to say that the semantic truth notion is a pre-theoretic notion. For pretheoretically, we do not seem to apply “true” to sentences. So, if the semantic truth notion is in any interesting way related to a pre-theoretic notion of truth, then the relationship is more complex. As I shall explain in Section 2, however, there are some straightforward ways of postulating an analytic link between semantic truth notions and ordinary truth.
Keywords Truth  Semantics
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2008.00174.x
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
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Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Relativism 2: Semantic Content.Max Kölbel - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.
Relativism and Assertion.Alexander Dinges - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):730-740.
The Conversational Role of Centered Contents.Max Kölbel - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):97-121.
“True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.
Relativism 1: Representational Content.Max Kölbel - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):38-51.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

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