Ratio 10 (1):35-47 (1997)

Authors
Max Kölbel
University of Vienna
Abstract
In the first chapter of his book Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright puts forward what he regards as ‘a fundamental and decisive objection’ to deflationism about truth. His objection proceeds by an argument to the conclusion that truth and warranted assertibility coincide in normative force and potentially diverge in extension. This argument has already received some attention. However, I do not believe that it has been fully understood yet. In this short paper, I shall assess the cogency of Wright’s objection in some detail. My agenda is as follows. First, I give what I believe to be an adequate rendering of the objection. Secondly, I reveal the real force of the neutrality argument and say thirdly why it does not, as Wright thinks, refute deflationism. Finally, I argue that Wright’s insistence that truth is a ‘substantial property’ is uncongenial to the overall project of his book.
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DOI 10.1111/rati.1997.10.issue-1
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Citations of this work BETA

Simplifying Alethic Pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
On Wright's Argument Against Deflationism.Alexander Miller - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):527-531.

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