Utilitas 14 (2):219 (2002)
What I call hegemonism holds that a satisfactory moral theory must in a fairly direct way guide action. This, the hegemonist believes, provides a constraint on moral theorizing. We should not accept moral theories which cannot in the proper sense guide us. There are two alternatives to hegemonism. One is motivational indirection, which is the idea that while agents remain motivated by a moral theory, they may be only indirectly motivated. The other is non-hegemonism, which holds that a correct moral theory need not in any direct or indirect sense guide or motivate actions. In the main part of the paper I discuss widely endorsed objections to motivational indirection and nonhegemonism, and I argue that these objections all fail. Hence, motivational indirection and non-hegemonism remain viable conceptions of moral theory
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality.Charles W. Wright - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (4):47-74.
Beyond Stockholders and Stakeholders: A Plea for Corporate Moral Autonomy. [REVIEW]James M. Humber - 2002 - Journal of Business Ethics 36 (3):207 - 221.
Education in Moral Theory and the Improvement of Moral Thought.Jonathan Friday * - 2004 - Journal of Moral Education 33 (1):23-33.
When Can One Requirement Override Another?Alex Rajczi - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (3):309 - 326.
Moral Philosophy and Moral Psychology in Mencius.James A. Ryan - 1998 - Asian Philosophy 8 (1):47 – 64.
Beyond the Bottom Line: The Theoretical Goals of Moral Theorizing.Jason Brennan - 2008 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2):277-296.
Challenges to Audi's Ethical Intuitionism.Klemens Kappel - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):391-413.
The Uses and Abuses of Moral Theory in Bioethics.Raymond de Vries - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):419-430.
A Problem for Harman's Moral Relativism.William L. Langenfus - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:121-136.
Added to index2010-08-30
Total downloads56 ( #93,541 of 2,168,588 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #187,166 of 2,168,588 )
How can I increase my downloads?