An ideal solution to disputes about multiply realized kinds

Philosophical Studies 140 (2):161 - 177 (2008)
Abstract
Multiply realizable kinds are scientifically problematic, for it appears that we should not expect discoveries about them to hold of other members of that kind. As such, it looks like MR kinds should have no place in the ontology of the special sciences. Many resist this conclusion, however, because we lack a positive account of the role that certain realization-unrestricted terms play in special science explanations. I argue that many such terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many of the features normally associated with explanation by MR kinds. As idealized models are usually mere possibilia, such explanations do not run afoul of the metaphysical problems that plague MR kinds.
Keywords Mind  Multiple Realization  Realization  Idealization
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9135-7
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References found in this work BETA
Unified Theories of Cognition.Allen Newell - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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