British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403 (1992)
Davidson has argued that there can be no laws linking psychological states with physical states. I stress that this argument depends crucially on there being no purely psychological laws. All of this has to do with the holism and indeterminacy of the psychological domain. I criticize this claim by showing how Davidson misconstrues the role of ceteris paribus clauses in psychological explanation. Using a model of how ceteris paribus clauses operate derived from Lakatos, I argue that if Davidson is correct, then there can be no purely physical laws either. This is illustrated with a case from immunology involving interferons. Since there clearly are physical laws, Davidson cannot be correct
|Keywords||Epistemology Monism Psychology Rationality Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Cartwright, Forces, and Ceteris Paribus Laws.Barry Ward - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):55-62.
Ceteris Paribus Laws and Psychological Explanations.Charles Wallis - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:388-397.
In Defense of Psychological Laws.Martin Carrier - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):217 – 232.
Can Capacities Rescue Us From Ceteris Paribus Laws?Markus Schrenk - 2007 - In B. Gnassounou & M. Kistler (eds.), Dispositions in Philosophy and Science. Ashgate.
Anomalous Monism and Physical Closure.Hancock Nancy Slonneger - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):175-185.
Ceteris Paribus Laws.Alexander Reutlinger, Gerhard Schurz & Andreas Hüttemann - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them. [REVIEW]Marc Lange - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):281Ð301.
"Ceteris Paribus", There Is No Problem of Provisos.John Earman & John Roberts - 1999 - Synthese 118 (3):439 - 478.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads76 ( #68,010 of 2,157,997 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #198,258 of 2,157,997 )
How can I increase my downloads?