Authors
Jacob Klein
Colgate University
Abstract
This article argues that Epictetus employs the terms orexis and hormê in the same manner as the older Stoics. It then shows, on the basis of this claim, that the older Stoics recognized a distinction between dispositional and occurrent forms of motivation. On this account of Stoic theory, intentional action is in each instance the product of two forms of cognition: a value ascription that attributes goodness or badness to some object, conceiving of its possession as beneficial or harmful to the agent, together with a situational judgment about appropriate action. The resulting interpretation suggests that the Stoic theory of motivation as a whole — and not merely the Stoic analysis of the pathê — has the basic shape of a practical syllogism, with more psychological depth than commentators have recognized.
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DOI 10.1515/agph-2017-0113
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References found in this work BETA

Stoic Moral Psychology.Tad Brennan - 2003 - In B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Stoic Notion of a Lekton.Michael Frede - 1994 - In Stephen Everson (ed.), Language. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--128.
On the Stoic Conception of the Good.Michael Frede - 1999 - In Katerina Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy. Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epictetus.Margaret Graver - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Psychological Disease and Action-Guiding Impressions in Early Stoicism.Simon Shogry - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (5):784-805.

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