Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation

Oxford University Press (1990)

This book casts new light on the traditional disagreement between those who hold that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions if they are causally determined, and those who deny this. Klein suggests that reflection on the relation between justice and deprivation offers a way out of this perplexity
Keywords Blame  Compatibilism  Deprivation  Determinism  Free Will  Incompatibilism  Metaphysics  Responsibility  Frankfurt, H  Van Inwagen, P
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Call number BJ1468.5.K54 1990
ISBN(s) 0198248342   9780198248347  
DOI 10.2307/2219803
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Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.
Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.
Power and Moral Responsibility.Thomas Pink - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):127 – 149.
Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.
Does the Free Will Debate Rest on a Mistake?Saul Smilansky - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (3):173-88.

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