Analysis 65 (1):44-49 (2005)
This paper continues a thread in Analysis begun by Adam Rieger and Nicholas Denyer. Rieger argued that Frege’s theory of thoughts violates Cantor’s theorem by postulating as many thoughts as concepts. Denyer countered that Rieger’s construction could not show that the thoughts generated are always distinct for distinct concepts. By focusing on universally quantified thoughts, rather than thoughts that attribute a concept to an individual, I give a different construction that avoids Denyer’s problem. I also note that this problem for Frege’s philosophy was discovered by Bertrand Russell as early as 1902 and has been discussed intermittently since.
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Russell, His Paradoxes, and Cantor's Theorem: Part I.Kevin C. Klement - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):16-28.
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