Studia Logica 108 (1):85-128 (2020)

Authors
Alessandra Marra
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
This paper focuses on the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for goals in plans, and a normal operator for derived oughts. We prove two completeness theorems for the resulting logic, and provide a dynamic extension of the logic by means of product updates. We illustrate how this setting informs deontic logic by considering issues related to the filtering of inconsistent oughts, the restricted validity of deontic closure, and the stability of oughts and goals under dynamics.
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DOI 10.1007/s11225-019-09854-5
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References found in this work BETA

Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Modal Logic.Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema - 2001 - Studia Logica 76 (1):142-148.
Why Be Rational&Quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.
Modal Logic.Marcus Kracht - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):299-301.

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