Authors
Abstract
In this talk, Hume’s distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the Treatise of Human Nature will be discussed. It will be argued that Hume accuses previous moral philosophers neither of committing a logical error in their reasoning, nor of falling short of a possible deduction of an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ because of false assumptions. Rather, Hume argues that these philosophers have an incorrect notion of reason: By means of reason, we do not discover eternal moral truths, and also, reason does not motivate us. According to Hume, reason reveals only causal relations that exist between external facts and our emotions, which are facts as well. The ‘ought’ is located just in our emotions and not in the things which evoke the moral emotions inside us
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI wcp22200810992
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,756
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Humes Reason.David Owen - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Hume on the Distinction of Reason.Paul Hoffman - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1131 - 1141.
Hume and Instrumental Reason.J. Mintoff - 1998 - Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (4):519-538.
Is Hume a Sceptic with Regard to Reason?Fred Wilson - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:275-319.
Three Questions About Treatise 1.4.2.Georges Dicker - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):115-153.
Reason in Hume’s Passions.Nathan Brett & Katharina Paxman - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (1):43-59.
Hume’s Reasons.Aaron Zimmerman - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (2):211-256.
From Conceivability to Possibility.Roger S. Woolhouse - 1972 - Ratio (Misc.) 14 (2):144--154.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-04-04

Total views
15 ( #616,948 of 2,333,957 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #584,690 of 2,333,957 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes