David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):287 – 297 (1992)
There has been much discussion concerning the consequences of 'going natural', i.e., of replacing a priori epistemology with empirical psychology. Traditionalists claim that a naturalized epistemology is not viable—to eliminate the normative from an account of knowledge is to cease to do epistemology at all. Naturalists claim that a naturalized account is the only viable one—assuming, in step with the urgings of Quine, that there are no standards independent of (and external to) science, science itself must act as the sole epistemic norm. In the wake of the above debate some epistemologists have attempted to argue in favor of, and develop, a middle-ground position— normative naturalism . Such a position is intended to be consistent with the naturalist's intuition that the traditional search for a 'first philosophy'is misguided and consistent with the traditionalist's intuition that a complete elimination of the normative would leave epistemology impotent. In this paper I will examine one argument in favor of a normative naturalism . / will show that such a proposal is inherently problematic and argue that naturalism and normativity are mutually exclusive concepts. Therefore, I suggest that, even in the 'age of cognitive science', epistemologists continue to do traditional epistemology by attempting to develop, a priori , the general criteria for determining the justificatory status of our (scientific) beliefs.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
W. V. Quine (ed.) (1981). Theories and Things. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1974). The Roots of Reference. Lasalle, Ill., Open Court.
W. V. Quine (1962). Theories and Things. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (51):234-244.
Robert N. Mccauley (1988). Epistemology in an Age of Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):143-152.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert N. McCauley (1992). Defending Normative Naturalism: A Reply to Ellen Klein. Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):299 – 305.
Similar books and articles
Dirk Hartmann & Rainer Lange (2000). Epistemology Culturalized. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):75-107.
Dan McArthur (2005). Normative Naturalism and the Relativised a Priori. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):331 - 350.
Wybo Houkes (2002). Normativity in Quine's Naturalism: The Technology of Truth-Seeking? [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):251-267.
Chase Wrenn (2006). Epistemology as Engineering? Theoria 72 (1):60-79.
M. Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Larry Laudan (1990). Normative Naturalism. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):44-59.
Added to index2009-03-08
Total downloads16 ( #281,381 of 1,924,993 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #418,001 of 1,924,993 )
How can I increase my downloads?