Multiple realizability and the semantic view of theories

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):683-695 (2013)
Abstract
Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, powerful language available. On a semantic view, traditional notions of multiple realizability are thus very hard to motivate. At best, one must abandon either the idea that multiple realizability is an interesting scientific notion, or else admit that multiply realizable properties do not automatically block scientific reductions
Keywords Multiple realizability  Semantic view  Theories  Reduction  Models
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9839-6
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Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Ronald N. Giere - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.

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The Case for Multiple Realization in Biology.Wei Fang - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (1-2):3.

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