Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons [Book Review]

In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.2307/2653735
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Miles Little (2013). Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Medicine Rests on Solid Foundations. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):467-470.
Richard Fumerton (2004). Epistemic Probability. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):149–164.

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