Some things about stuff

Philosophical Studies 135 (3):407-423 (2007)
Abstract
I examine the implications of positing stuff as a way to avoid colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze that constitutes it. When characterising stuff, it’s intuitive to say we often individuate stuff kinds by appealing to things and their relations. I argue that if this intuition is correct, there are important restrictions on how we can characterise stuff in order to avoid colocated portions of stuff.
Keywords stuff  constitution  coincidence  colocation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9075-2
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,349
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
7. Theories of Location.Josh Parsons - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:201.
Simples, Stuff, and Simple People.Ned Markosian - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):405-428.
Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution.Dean W. Zimmerman - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):53-110.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
A Return to the Analogy of Being.Kris McDaniel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Stuff and Coincidence.Thomas J. McKay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3081-3100.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Stuff and Things.Richard E. Grandy - 1975 - Synthese 31 (3-4):479 - 485.
Substance.Justin Broackes - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):131–166.
Identity, Quantification, and Number.Eric T. Olson - 2012 - In T. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 66-82.
Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.Ralph Wedgwood - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 201--229.
Summation Relations and Portions of Stuff.Maureen Donnelly & Thomas Bittner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):167 - 185.
Words Without Objects.Henry Laycock - 2006 - Clarendon Press Oxford.
Some Stuffs Are Not Sums of Stuff.David Barnett - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (1):89-100.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
140 ( #35,092 of 2,193,594 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #290,647 of 2,193,594 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature