Universals and particulars in a phenomenalist ontology

Philosophy of Science 27 (3):254-261 (1960)
Abstract
A phenomenalist philosophy which employs the Principle of Acquaintance (PA) plus the Principle that what exists are the referents of certain meaningful terms, defined by PA, cannot include either universals or particulars in its ontology, but is limited to instances of universals as constituting the range of ontological existents. Universals must be omitted since they are repeatable and, hence, never wholly presented or contained, whereas the objects of direct acquaintance are wholly and exhaustively presented. Furthermore, no entities beyond characters (qualities and relations) are given in direct acquaintance; hence, particulars, too, must be omitted for the phenomenalist who relies on PA
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/287744
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,208
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Problem of Universals.Charles Landesman - 1971 - New York: Basic Books.
Bare Particulars.Theodore Sider - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
On Being and Being Presented.Herbert Hochberg - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (2):123-136.
Russell on the Relations of Universals and Particulars.Larry Lee Blackman - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:265-278.
Particulars, Universals and Russell's Late Ontology.Herbert Hochberg - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:129-137.
Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology.Michael J. Loux (ed.) - 1970 - University of Notre Dame Press.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

14 ( #331,287 of 2,164,293 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #348,039 of 2,164,293 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums