In Courtland Lewis & Gregory L. Bock (eds.),
The Ethics of Anger. New York, NY, USA: pp. 199-213 (
2020)
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Abstract
Oppression makes me angry. So, I am angry almost all of the time, as oppression (of various kinds) is endemic to our socio-political world. However, there is a growing philosophical literature that argues against anger as a necessary, virtuous, or important response to wrongdoing. Martha Nussbaum, in particular, argues that “anger is always normatively problematic, whether in the personal or in the public realm.” It is certainly true that anger can have bad or problematic effects, and it may well be true that Nussbaum, and others who hold similar views, are on the right track in the moral realm. However, despite the serious moral worries surrounding anger (which I discuss in more detail below), I contend that maintaining an anti-anger position is mistaken in regard to the socio-political realm. In particular, I argue that anger is both an important, and a virtuous, response to the presence of oppression, that is, to the presence of widespread injustices that disproportionately negatively affect certain social groups, and their members, within and across societies. Anger, when in response to oppression, has the potential to be, not a vice, but a virtue.