Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):673-677 (2019)

Authors
Justin Klocksiem
New Mexico State University
Abstract
The counterfactual comparative account of harm has emerged as the main contender in the recent literature on the nature of harm. But Erik Carlson argues that the account violates plausible normative principles connecting harm with our reasons to perform certain actions and to prefer certain outcomes. According to Carlson, the account implies that we have reason to perform actions and to prefer outcomes that we do not in fact possess. This paper defends the counterfactual comparative account from these objections.
Keywords Harm  counterfactual comparative account  Erik Carlson
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-019-10025-7
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References found in this work BETA

Doing Away with Harm.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
A Defense of the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Justin Klocksiem - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):285 – 300.
Doing Away with Harm.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Erik Carlson - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):407-413.

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