Philosophia 46 (4):911-928 (2018)

Authors
Peter Königs
RWTH Aachen University
Abstract
Debunking arguments aim at defeating the justification of a belief by revealing the belief to have a dubious genealogy. One prominent example of such a debunking argument is Richard Joyce’s evolutionary debunking explanation of morality. Joyce’s argument targets only our belief in moral facts, while our belief in prudential facts is exempt from his evolutionary critique. In this paper, I suggest that our belief in prudential facts falls victim to evolutionary debunking, too. Just as our moral sense can be explained in evolutionary terms, so presumably can our tendency to judge our actions in prudential terms. And if the evolutionary explanation of our moral sense has an undermining effect, then so does the evolutionary explanation of our belief in prudential facts. This also undermines moral fictionalism, the view that we have prudential reasons to maintain moral discourse as a fiction. I consider and refute four possible objections to the suggested debunking of our belief in prudential normativity.
Keywords Debunking  Prudential value  Wellbeing  Welfare  Evolution  Richard Joyce
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9932-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,268
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 60 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Putting Together Morality and Well-Being.Ruth Chang - 2004 - In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 118--158.
The Tale of a Moderate Normative Skeptic.Brendan Cline - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):141-161.
The Authority Account of Prudential Options.Keith Horton - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):17-35.
The Varieties of Normativity.Derek Clayton Baker - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 567-581.
The Normativity of Morality.Sanghyuk Park - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Kansas
Does It Matter Whether We Do Wrong?Adam Kadlac - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2279-2298.
Morality and Normativity*: Michael J. Perry.Michael J. Perry - 2007 - Legal Theory 13 (3-4):211-255.
Prudence and Anti-Prudence.Evan Simpson - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):73 - 86.
Self-Love and Altruism.David O. Brink - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):122-157.
Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.
When Evolutionary Game Theory Explains Morality, What Does It Explain?Justin D'arms - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):296-299.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-12-09

Total views
56 ( #188,662 of 2,444,875 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #232,731 of 2,444,875 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes