Carl Knight
University of Glasgow
Discrimination might be considered unjust on account of the comparative disadvantage it imposes, the absolute disadvantage it imposes, the disrespect it shows, or the prejudice it shows. This article argues that each of these accounts overlooks some cases of unjust discrimination. In response to this state of affairs we might combine two or more of these accounts. A promising approach combines the comparative disadvantage and absolute disadvantage accounts.
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DOI 10.1080/02580136.2013.810416
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.Richard J. Arneson - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):77 - 93.
Equality and Priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.
Index.T. M. Scanlon - 2008 - In Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Harvard University Press. pp. 243-247.

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Counterfactual Discrimination.D. C. Matthew - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):495-504.

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