Vérité sans vérités ? Réponse à Kevin Mulligan

Philosophiques 38 (1):195-217 (2011)

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Des philosophes de la logique comme Prior et Mulligan considèrent le connecteur de vérité ‘Il est vrai que ’ comme étant plus fondamental que le prédicat de vérité ‘ est vrai’. Des philosophes comme Bolzano et Horwich ont adopté l’ordre inverse de priorités et je me suis rallié à eux dans Conceptions of Truth. Je continue à penser que le prédicat « porte la culotte » et vais tenter de désamorcer les arguments contre cette conception, mais je vais aussi rejeter un de mes arguments antérieurs en faveur de celle-ci.Logical Philosophers like Prior and Mulligan regard the truth connective ‘It is true that ’ as more basic than the truth predicate ‘ is true’. Philosophers like Bolzano and Horwich have adopted the opposite priority setting, and in Conceptions of Truth I joined them. I still think that the predicate ‘wears the trousers’, and I shall try to defuse the arguments against this view, but I shall also reject one of my earlier arguments for it
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DOI 10.7202/1005723ar
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Abstrakte Gegenstände. Semantik und Ontologie.Wolfgang Künne - 1987 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 41 (1):153-156.
Negation.Ernesto Napoli - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):233-252.

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