Heidegger’s Unlikely Alliance with Locke in Identifying Truth and Knowledge

Philosophia 50 (4):1-14 (2022)
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The paper examines Heidegger’s notions of truth and knowledge in the context of Locke’s theory of same. It argues that when Heidegger’s expositions of "primordial truth" and knowledge as a "retainment of assertion" are analyzed in their Beings, new and improved definitions emerge which support Locke’s ideas of truth and knowledge. It shows that Heidegger’s primordial truth is the process which uncovers Locke’s propositional truth and on which any knowledge must be based. Wherefrom, to solve the problem of what knowledge is and how one defines it, one must start with Heidegger’s conceptions of truth and knowledge.

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Author Profiles

Atina Knowles
Rowan University
Atina Knowles
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

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