Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies

Abstract
When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can proceed either by thinking about the entity from a *functional* standpoint or by thinking about the entity from a *physical* standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking asymmetry. It appears that ascriptions of states involving phenomenal consciousness are sensitive to physical factors in a way that ascriptions of other states are not
Keywords Consciousness  Folk psychology  Theory of mind  Experimental philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y
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References found in this work BETA
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal 57 (1):29-50.

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Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.

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