Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation

Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325 (2003)
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Abstract

Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people’s concept of intentional action.<b> </b>.

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Joshua Knobe
Yale University

References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Words, Thoughts, and Theories.Alison Gopnik - 1997 - Cambridge: MIT Press. Edited by Andrew N. Meltzoff.

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